Ewriting Format by Carl Peterson © 2001

PREFACE
Rapid growth accompanied by a somewhat painful readjustment has been one of the leading characteristics of the history of the United States during the last half century.

In the West the change has been so swift and spectacular as
to approach a complete metamorphosis.


with the passing of the frontier has gone something of the old freedom and the old opportunity;
and the inevitable change has brought forth inevitable protest,
particularly from the agricultural class.

Simple farming communities have wakened
to find themselves complex industrial regions in which the farmers have frequently lost their former preferred position.

The result has been a series of radical agitations on the part of farmers determined
to better their lot.

These movements have manifested different degrees of coherence and intelligence,
but all have had something of the same purpose and spirit,
and all may justly be considered as stages of the still unfinished agrarian crusade.

This book is an attempt
to sketch the course and
to reproduce the spirit of that crusade from its inception
with the Granger movement,
through the Greenback and populist phases,

to a climax in the battle
for free silver.In the preparation of the chapters dealing
with Populism I received invaluable assistance from my colleague,
Professor Lester B.

Shippee of the University of Minnesota;
and I am indebted
to my wife
for aid at every stage of the work,
especially in the revision of the manuscript.Solon J.

Buck.Minnesota Historical Society.

St.

Paul.CONTENTS
I.

THE INCEPTION OF THE GRANGE
II.

THE RISING SPIRIT OF UNREST
III.

THE GRANGER MOVEMENT AT FLOOD TIDE
IV.

CURBING THE RAILROADS
V.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE GRANGER MOVEMENT
VI.

THE GREENBACK INTERLUDE
VII.

THE PLIGHT OF THE FARMER
VIII.

THE FARMERS' ALLIANCE
IX.

THE PEOPLE'S PARTY LAUNCHED
X.

THE POPULIST BOMBSHELL OF 1892
XI.

THE SILVER ISSUE
XII.

THE BATTLE OF THE STANDARDS
XIII.

THE LEAVEN OF RADICALISM
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
THE AGRARIAN CRUSADE
CHAPTER I.

THE INCEPTION OF THE GRANGE
When President Johnson authorized the Commissioner of Agriculture,
in 1866,

to send a clerk in his bureau on a trip through the Southern States
to procure "statistical and other information from those States," he could scarcely have foreseen that this trip would lead
to a movement among the farmers,
which,
in varying forms,
would affect the political and economic life of the nation
for half a century.

The clerk selected
for this mission,
one Oliver Hudson Kelley,
was something more than a mere collector of data and compiler of statistics:

he was a keen observer and a thinker.

Kelley was born in Boston of a good Yankee family that could boast kinship
with Oliver Wendell Holmes and Judge Samuel Sewall.

At the age of twenty-three he journeyed
to Iowa,
where he married.

Then
with his wife he went on
to Minnesota,
settled in Elk River Township,
and acquired some first-hand familiarity
with agriculture.

At the time of Kelley's service in the agricultural bureau he was forty years old,
a man of dignified presence,

with a full beard already turning white,
the high broad forehead of a philosopher,
and the eager eyes of an enthusiast.

"An engine
with too much steam on all the time"--so one of his friends characterized him;
and the abnormal energy which he displayed on the trip through the South justifies the figure.Kelley had had enough practical experience in agriculture
to be sympathetically aware of the difficulties of farm life in the period immediately following the Civil War.

Looking at the Southern farmers not as a hostile Northerner would but as a fellow agriculturist,
he was struck
with the distressing conditions which prevailed.

It was not merely the farmers' economic difficulties which he noticed,

for such difficulties were
to be expected in the South in the adjustment after the great conflict;
it was rather their blind disposition
to do as their grandfathers had done,
their antiquated methods of agriculture,
and,
most of all,
their apathy.

Pondering on this attitude,
Kelley decided that it was fostered if not caused by the lack of social opportunities which made the existence of the farmer such a drear monotony that he became practically incapable of changing his outlook on life or his attitude toward his work.Being essentially a man of action,
Kelley did not stop
with the mere observation of these evils but cast about
to find a remedy.

In doing so,
he came
to the conclusion that a national secret order of farmers resembling the Masonic order,
of which he was a member,
might serve
to bind the farmers together
for purposes of social and intellectual advancement.

After he returned from the South,
Kelley discussed the plan in Boston
with his niece,
Miss Carrie Hall,
who argued quite sensibly that women should be admitted
to full membership in the order,
if it was
to accomplish the desired ends.

Kelley accepted her suggestion and went West
to spend the summer in farming and dreaming of his project.

The next year found him again in Washington,
but this time as a clerk in the Post Office Department.During the summer and fall of 1867 Kelley interested some of his associates in his scheme.

As a result seven men--"one fruit grower and six government clerks,
equally distributed among the Post Office,
Treasury,
and Agricultural Departments"--are usually recognized as the founders of the Patrons of Husbandry,
or,
as the order is more commonly called,
the Grange.

These men,
all of whom but one had been born on farms,
were O.

H.

Kelley and W.

M.

Ireland of the Post Office Department,
William Saunders and the Reverend A.

B.

Grosh of the Agricultural Bureau,
the Reverend John Trimble and J.

R.

Thompson of the Treasury Department,
and F.

M.

McDowell,
a pomologist of Wayne,
New York.

Kelley and Ireland planned a ritual
for the society;
Saunders interested a few farmers at a meeting of the United States Pomological Society in St.

Louis in August,
and secured the cooperation of McDowell;
the other men helped these four in corresponding
with interested farmers and in perfecting the ritual.

On December 4,
1867,
having framed a constitution and adopted the mot
to Es
to perpetua,
they met and constituted themselves the National Grange of the Patrons of Husbandry.

Saunders was
to be Master;
Thompson,
Lecturer;
Ireland,
Treasurer;
and Kelley,
Secretary.It is interesting
to note,
in view of the subsequent political activity in which the movement
for agricultural organization became inevitably involved,
that the founders of the Grange looked
for advantages
to come
to the farmer through intellectual and social intercourse,
not through political action.

Their purpose was "the advancement of agriculture," but they expected that advancement
to be an educative rather than a legislative process.

It was
to that end,

for instance,
that they provided
for a Grange "Lecturer,
" a man whose business it was
to prepare
for each meeting a program apart from the prescribed ritual--perhaps a paper read by one of the members or an address by a visiting speaker.


with this plan
for social and intellectual advancement,
then,
the founders of the Grange set out
to gain members.During the first four years the order grew slowly,
partly because of the mistakes of the founders,
partly because of the innate conservatism and suspicion of the average farmer.

The first local Grange was organized in Washington.

It was made up largely of government clerks and their wives and served less
to advance the cause of agriculture than
to test the ritual.

In February,
1868,
Kelley resigned his clerkship in the Post Office Department and turned his whole attention
to the organization of the new order.

His colleagues,
in optimism or irony,
voted him a salary of two thousand dollars a year and traveling expenses,

to be paid from the receipts of any subordinate Granges he should establish.

Thus authorized,
Kelley bought a ticket
for Harrisburg,
and
with two dollars and a half in his pocket,
started out
to work his way
to Minnesota by organizing Granges.

On his way out he sold four dispensations
for the establishment of branch organizations--three
for Granges in Harrisburg,
Columbus,
and Chicago,
which came
to nothing,
and one
for a Grange in Fredonia,
New York,
which was the first regular,
active,
and permanent local organization.

This,
it is important
to note,
was established as a result of correspondence
with a farmer of that place,
and in by far the smallest town of the four.

Kelley seems at first
to have made the mistake of attempting
to establish the order in the large cities,
where it had no native soil in which
to grow.When Kelley revised his plan and began
to work from his farm in Minnesota and among neighbors whose main interest was in agriculture,
he was more successful.

His progress was not,
however,
so marked as
to insure his salary and expenses;
in fact,
the whole history of these early years represents the hardest kind of struggle against financial difficulties.

Later,
Kelley wrote of this difficult period:

"If all great enterprises,

to be permanent,
must necessarily start from small beginnings,
our Order is all right.

Its foundation was laid on SOLID NOTHING--the rock of poverty--and there is no harder material."

At times the persistent secretary found himself unable even
to buy postage
for his circular letters.

His friends at Washington began
to lose interest in the work of an order
with a treasury "so empty that a five-cent stamp would need an introduction before it would feel at home in it."

Their only letters
to Kelley during this trying time were written
to remind him of bills owed by the order.

The total debt was not more than $150,
yet neither the Washington members nor Kelley could find funds
to liquidate it.

"My dear brother," wrote Kelley
to Ireland,
"you must not swear when the printer comes in .

.

.

.

When they come in
to 'dun' ask them
to take a seat;
light your pipe;
lean back in a chair,
and suggest
to them that some plan be adopted
to bring in ten or twenty members,
and thus furnish funds
to pay their bills."

A note of $39,
in the hands of one Mr. Bean,
caused the members in Washington further embarrassment at this time and occasioned a gleam of humor in one of Kelley's letters.

Bean's calling on the men at Washington,
he wrote,
at least reminded them of the absentee,
and
to be cursed by an old friend was better than
to be forgotten.

"I suggest," he continued,
"that Granges use black and white BEANS
for ballots."


In spite of all his difficulties,
Kelley stubbornly continued his endeavor and kept up the fiction of a powerful central order at the capital by circulating photographs of the founders and letters which spoke in glowing terms of the great national organization of the Patrons of Husbandry.

"It must be advertised as vigorously as if it were a patent medicine," he said;
and
to that end he wrote articles
for leading agricultural papers,
persuaded them
to publish the constitution of the Grange,
and inserted from time
to time press notices which kept the organization before the public eye.

In May,
1868,
came the first fruits of all this correspondence and advertisement--the establishment of a Grange at Newton,
Iowa.

In September,
the first permanent Grange in Minnesota,
the North Star Grange,
was established at St.

Paul
with the assistance of Colonel D.

A.

Robertson.

This gentleman and his associates interested themselves in spreading the order.

They revised the Grange circulars
to appeal
to the farmer's pocketbook,
emphasizing the fact that the order offered a means of protection against corporations and opportunities
for cooperative buying and selling.

This practical appeal was more effective than the previous idealistic propaganda:

two additional Granges were established before the end of the year;
a state Grange was constituted early in the next year;
and by the end of 1869 there were in Minnesota thirty-seven active Granges.

In the spring of 1869 Kelley went East and,
after visiting the thriving Grange in Fredonia,
he made his report at Washington
to the members of the National Grange,
who listened perfunctorily,
passed a few laws,
and relapsed in
to indifference after this first regular annual session.But however indifferent the members of the National Grange might be as
to the fate of the organization they had so irresponsibly fathered,
Kelley was zealous and untiring in its behalf.

That the founders did not deny their parenthood was enough
for him;
he returned
to his home
with high hopes
for the future.


with the aid of his niece he carried on an indefatigible correspondence which soon brought tangible returns.

In October,
1870,
Kelley moved his headquarters
to Washington.

By the end of the year the Order had penetrated nine States of the Union,
and correspondence looking
to its establishment in seven more States was well under way.

Though Granges had been planted as far east as Vermont and New Jersey and as far south as Mississippi and South Carolina,
the life of the order as yet centered in Minnesota,
Iowa,
Wisconsin,
Illinois,
and Indiana.

These were the only States in which,
in its four years of activity the Grange had really taken root;
in other States only sporadic local Granges sprang up.

The method of organization,
however,
had been found and tested.

When a few active subordinate Granges had been established in a State,
they convened as a temporary state Grange,
the master of which appointed deputies
to organize other subordinate Granges throughout the State.

The initiation fees,
generally three dollars
for men and fifty cents
for women,
paid the expenses of organization--fifteen dollars
to the deputy,
and not infrequently a small sum
to the state Grange.

What was left went in
to the treasury of the local Grange.

Thus by the end of 1871 the ways and means of spreading the Grange had been devised.

All that was now needed was some impelling motive which should urge the farmers
to enter and support the organization.


CHAPTER II.

THE RISING SPIRIT OF UNREST
The decade of the seventies witnessed the subsidence,
if not the solution,
of a problem which had vexed American history
for half a century--the reconciliation of two incompatible social and economic systems,
the North and the South.

It witnessed at the same time the rise of another great problem,
even yet unsolved--the preservation of equality of opportunity,
of democracy,
economic as well as political,
in the face of the rising power and influence of great accumulations and combinations of wealth.

Almost before the battle smoke of the Civil War had rolled away,
dissatisfaction
with prevailing conditions both political and economic began
to show itself.The close of the war naturally found the Republican or Union party in control throughout the North.

Branded
with the opprobrium of having opposed the conduct of the war,
the Democratic party remained impotent
for a number of years;
and Ulysses S.

Grant,
the nation's greatest military hero,
was easily elected
to the presidency on the Republican ticket in 1868.

In the latter part of Grant's first term,
however,
hostility began
to manifest itself among the Republicans themselves toward the politicians in control at Washington.

Several causes tended
to alienate from the President and his advisers the sympathies of many of the less partisan and less prejudiced Republicans throughout the North.

Charges of corruption and maladministration were rife and had much foundation in truth.

Even if Grant himself was not consciously dishonest in his application of the spoils system and in his willingness
to receive reward in return
for political favors,
he certainly can be justly charged
with the disposition
to trust too blindly in his friends and
to choose men
for public office rather because of his personal preferences than because of their qualifications
for positions of trust.Grant's enemies declared,
moreover,

with considerable truth that the man was a military autocrat,
unfit
for the highest civil position in a democracy.

His high-handed policy in respect
to Reconstruction in the South evoked opposition from those
Northern Republicans whose critical sense was not entirely blinded by sectional prejudice and passion.

The keener-sighted of the Northerners began
to suspect that Reconstruction in the South often amounted
to little more than the looting of the governments of the Southern States by the greedy freedmen and the unscrupulous carpetbaggers,

with the troops of the United States standing by
to protect the looters.

In 1871,
under color of necessity arising from the intimidation of voters in a few sections of the South,
Congress passed a stringent act,
empowering the President
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus and
to use the military at any time
to suppress disturbances or attempts
to intimidate voters.

This act,
in the hands of radicals,
gave the carpetbag governments of the Southern States practically unlimited powers.

Any citizens who worked against the existing administrations,
however peacefully,
might be charged
with intimidation of voters and prosecuted under the new act.

Thus these radical governments were made practically self-perpetuating.

When their corruption,
wastefulness,
and inefficiency became evident,
many people in the North frankly condemned them and the Federal Government which continued
to support them.This dissatisfaction
with the Administration on the part of Republicans and independents came
to a head in 1872 in the Liberal-Republican movement.

As early as 1870 a group of Republicans in Missouri,
disgusted by the excesses of the radicals in that State in the proscription of former Confederate sympathizers,
had led a bolt from the party,
had nominated B.

Gratz Brown
for governor,
and,

with the assistance of the Democrats,
had won the election.

The real leader of this movement was Senator Carl Schurz,
under whose influence the new party in Missouri declared not only
for the removal of political disabilities but also
for tariff revision and civil service reform and manifested opposition
to the alienation of the public domain
to private corporations and
to all schemes
for the repudiation of any part of the national debt.

Similar splits in the Republican party took place soon afterwards in other States,
and in 1872 the Missouri Liberals called a convention
to meet at Cincinnati
for the purpose of nominating a candidate
for the presidency.The new party was a coalition of rather diverse elements.

Prominent tariff reformers,
members of the Free Trade League,
such as David A.

Wells and Edward L.

Godkin of the Nation,
advocates of civil service reform,
of whom Carl Schurz was a leading representative,
and especially opponents of the reconstruction measures of the Administration,
such as Judge David Davis and Horace Greeley,
saw an opportunity
to promote their favorite policies through this new party organization.


to these sincere reformers were soon added such disgruntled politicians as A.

G.

Curtin of Pennsylvania and R.

E.

Fenton of New York,
who sought revenge
for the support which the Administration had given
to their personal rivals.

The principal bond of union was the common desire
to prevent the reelection of Grant.

The platform adopted by the Cincinnati convention reflected the composition of the party.

Opening
with a bitter denunciation of the President,
it declared in no uncertain terms
for civil service reform and the immediate and complete removal of political disabilities.

On the tariff,
however,
the party could come
to no agreement;
the free traders were unable
to overcome the opposition of Horace Greeley and his protectionist followers;
and the outcome was the reference of the question "
to the people in their congressional districts and the decision of Congress."


The leading candidates
for nomination
for the presidency were Charles Francis Adams,
David Davis,
Horace Greeley,
Lyman Trumbull,
and B.

Gratz Brown.

From these men,
as a result of manipulation,
the convention unhappily selected the one least suited
to lead the party
to victory Horace Greeley.

The only hope of success
for the movement was in cooperation
with that very Democratic party whose principles,
policies,
and leaders,
Greeley in his editorials had unsparingly condemned
for years.

His extreme protectionism repelled not only the Democrats but the tariff reformers who had played an important part in the organization of the Liberal Republican party.

Conservatives of both parties distrusted him as a man
with a dangerous propensity
to advocate "isms," a theoretical politician more objectionable than the practical man of machine politics,
and far more likely
to disturb the existing state of affairs and
to overturn the business of the country in his efforts at reform.

As the Nation expressed it,
"Greeley appears
to be 'boiled crow'
to more of his fellow citizens than any other candidate
for office in this or any other age of which we have record."


The regular Republican convention renominated Grant,
and the Democrats,
as the only chance of victory,
swallowed the candidate and the platform of the Liberals.

Doubtless Greeley's opposition
to the radical reconstruction measures and the fact that he had signed Jefferson Davis's bail-bond made the "crow" more palatable
to the Southern Democrats.

In the campaign Greeley's brilliant speeches were listened
to
with great respect.

His tour was a personal triumph;
but the very voters who hung eagerly on his speeches felt him
to be too impulsive and opinionated
to be trusted
with presidential powers.

They knew the worst which might be expected of Grant;
they could not guess the ruin which Greeley's dynamic powers might bring on the country if he used them unwisely.

In the end many of the original leaders of the Liberal movement supported Grant as the lesser of two evils.

The Liberal defection from the Republican ranks was more than offset by the refusal of Democrats
to vote
for Greeley,
and Grant was triumphantly reelected.The Liberal Republican party was undoubtedly weakened by the unfortunate selection of their candidate,
but it scarcely could have been victorious
with another candidate.

The movement was distinctly one of leaders rather than of the masses,
and the things
for which it stood most specifically--the removal of political disabilities in the South and civil service reform--awakened little enthusiasm among the farmers of the West.

These farmers on the other hand were beginning
to be very much interested in a number of economic reforms which would vitally affect their welfare,
such as the reduction and readjustment of the burden of taxation,
the control of corporations in the interests of the people,
the reduction and regulation of the cost of transporation,
and an increase in the currency supply.

Some of these propositions occasionally received recognition in Liberal speeches and platforms,
but several of them were anathema
to many of the Eastern leaders of that movement.

Had these leaders been gifted
with vision broad enough
to enable them
to appreciate the vital economic and social problems of the West,
the Liberal Republican movement might perhaps have caught the ground swell of agrarian discontent,
and the outcome might then have been the formation of an enduring national party of liberal tendencies broader and more progressive than the Liberal Republican party yet less likely
to be swept in
to the vagaries of extreme radicalism than were the Anti-Monopoly and Greenback parties of after years.

A number of western Liberals such as A.

Scott Sloan in Wisconsin and Ignatius Donnelly in Minnesota championed the farmers' cause,
it is true,
and in some States there was a fusion of party organizations;
but men like Schurz and Trumbull held aloof from these radical movements,
while Easterners like Godkin of the Nation met them
with ridicule and invective.The period from 1870
to 1873 has been characterized as one of rampant prosperity,
and such it was
for the commercial,
the manufacturing,
and especially the speculative interests of the country.


for the farmers,
however,
it was a period of bitter depression.

The years immediately following the close of the Civil War had seen a tremendous expansion of production,
particularly of the staple crops.

The demobilization of the armies,
the closing of war industries,
increased immigration,
the homestead law,
the introduction of improved machinery,
and the rapid advance of the railroads had all combined
to drive the agricultural frontier westward by leaps and bounds until it had almost reached the limit of successful cultivation under conditions which then prevailed.

As crop acreage and production increased,
prices went down in accordance
with the law of supply and demand,
and farmers all over the country found it difficult
to make a living.In the West and South--the great agricultural districts of the country--the farmers commonly bought their supplies and implements on credit or mortgaged their crops in advance;
and their profits at best were so slight that one bad season might put them thereafter entirely in the power of their creditors and force them
to sell their crops on their creditors' terMs. Many farms were heavily mortgaged,
too,
at rates of interest that ate up the farmers' profits.

During and after the Civil War the fluctuation of the currency and the high tariff worked especial hardship on the farmers as producers of staples which must be sold abroad in competition
with European products and as consumers of manufactured articles which must be bought at home at prices made arbitrarily high by the protective tariff.

In earlier times,
farmers thus harassed would have struck their tents and moved farther west,
taking up desirable land on the frontier and starting out in a fresh field of opportunity.

It was still possible
for farmers
to go west,
and many did so but only
to find that the opportunity
for economic independence on the edge of settlement had largely disappeared.

The era of the self-sufficing pioneer was drawing
to a close,
and the farmer on the frontier,
forced by natural conditions over which he had no control to--engage in the production of staples,
was fully as dependent on the market and on transportation facilities as was his competitor in the East.In the fall of 1873 came the greatest panic in the history of the nation,
and a period of financial depression began which lasted throughout the decade,
restricting industry,
commerce,
and even immigration.

On the farmers the blow fell
with special severity.

At the very time when they found it most difficult
to realize profit on their sales of produce,
creditors who had hither
to carried their debts from year
to year became insistent
for payment.

When mortgages fell due,
it was well-nigh impossible
to renew them;
and many a farmer saw years of labor go
for nothing in a heart-breaking foreclosure sale.

It was difficult
to get even short-term loans,
running from seed-time
to harvest.

This important function of lending money
to pay
for labor and thus secure a larger crop,
which has only recently been assumed by the Government in its establishment of farm loan banks,
had been performed by private capitalists who asked usurious rates of interest.

The farmers' protests against these rates had been loud;
and now,
when they found themselves unable
to get loans at any rate whatever,
their complaints naturally increased.

Looking around
for one cause
to which
to attribute all their misfortunes,
they pitched upon the corporations or monopolies,
as they chose
to call them,
and especially upon the railroads.At first the farmers had looked upon the coming of the railroads as an unmixed blessing.

The railroad had meant the opening up of new territory,
the establishment of channels of transportation by which they could send their crops
to market.

Without the railroad,
the farmer who did not live near a navigable stream must remain a backwoodsman;
he must make his own farm or his immediate community a self-sufficing unit;
he must get from his own land bread and meat and clothing
for his family;
he must be stock-raiser,
grain-grower,
farrier,
tinker,
soap-maker,
tanner,
chandler--Jack-of-all-trades and master of none.


with the railroad he gained access
to markets and the opportunity
to specialize in one kind of farming;
he could now sell his produce and buy in exchange many of the articles he had previously made
for himself at the expense of much time and labor.

Many farmers and farming communities bought railroad bonds in the endeavor
to increase transportation facilities;
all were heartily in sympathy
with the policy of the Government in granting
to corporations land along the route of the railways which they were
to construct.By 1878,
however,
the Government had actually given
to the railroads about thirty-five million acres,
and was pledged
to give
to the Pacific roads alone about one hundred and forty-five million acres more.

Land was now not so plentiful as it had been in 1850,
when this policy had been inaugurated,
and the farmers were naturally aggrieved that the railroads should own so much desirable land and should either hold it
for speculative purposes or demand
for it prices much higher than the Government had asked
for land adjacent
to it and no less valuable.

Moreover,
when railroads were merged and reorganized or passed in
to the hands of receivers the shares held by farmers were frequently wiped out or were greatly decreased in value.

Often railroad stock had been "watered"
to such an extent that high freight charges were necessary in order
to permit the payment of dividends.

Thus the farmer might find himself without his railroad stock,

with a mortgage on his land which he had incurred in order
to buy the stock,

with an increased burden of taxation because his township had also been gullible enough
to buy stock,
and
with a railroad whose excessive rates allowed him but a narrow margin of profit on his produce.When the farmers sought political remedies
for their economic ills,
they discovered that,
as a class,
they had little representation or influence either in Congress or in the state legislatures.

Before the Civil War the Southern planter had represented agricultural interests in Congress fairly well;
after the War the dominance of Northern interests left the Western farmer without his traditional ally in the South.

Political power was concentrated in the East and in the urban sections of the West.

Members of Congress were increasingly likely
to be from the manufacturing classes or from the legal profession,
which sympathized
with these classes rather than
with the agriculturists.

Only about seven per cent of the members of Congress were farmers;
yet in 1870 forty-seven per cent of the population was engaged in agriculture.

The only remedy
for the farmers was
to organize themselves as a class in order
to promote their common welfare.


CHAPTER III.

THE GRANGER MOVEMENT AT FLOOD TIDE

with these real or fancied grievances crying
for redress,
the farmers soon turned
to the Grange as the weapon ready at hand
to combat the forces which they believed were conspiring
to crush them.

In 1872 began the real spread of the order.

Where the Grange had previously reckoned in terms of hundreds of new lodges,
it now began
to speak of thousands.

State Granges were established in States where the year before the organization had obtained but a precarious foothold;
pioneer local Granges invaded regions which hither
to had been impenetrable.

Although the only States which were thoroughly organized were Iowa,
Minnesota,
South Carolina,
and Mississippi,
the rapid spread of the order in
to other States and its intensive growth in regions so far apart gave promise of its ultimate development in
to a national movement.This development was,

to be sure,
not without opposition.

When the Grangers began
to speak of their function in terms of business and political cooperation,
the forces against which they were uniting took alarm.

The commission men and local merchants of the South were especially apprehensive and,
it is said,
sometimes foreclosed the mortgages of planters who were so independent as
to join the order.

But here,
as elsewhere,
persecution defeated its own end;
the opposition of their enemies convinced the farmers of the merits of the Grange.In the East,
several circumstances retarded the movement.

In the first place,
the Eastern farmer had
for some time felt the Western farmer
to be his serious rival.

The Westerner had larger acreage and larger yields from his virgin soil than the Easterner from his smaller tracts of well-nigh exhausted land.

What crops the latter did produce he must sell in competition
with the Western crops,
and he was not eager
to lower freight charges
for his competitor.

A second deterrent
to the growth of the order in the East was the organization of two Granges among the commission men and the grain dealers of Boston and New York,
under the aegis of that clause of the constitution which declared any person interested in agriculture
to be eligible
to membership in the order.

Though the storm of protest which arose all over the country against this betrayal
to the enemy resulted in the revoking of the charters
for these Granges,
the Eastern farmer did not soon forget the incident.The year 1873 is important in the annals of the Grange because it marks the retirement of the "founders" from power.

In January of that year,
at the sixth session of the National Grange,
the temporary organization of government clerks was replaced by a permanent corporation,
officered by farmers.

Kelley was reelected Secretary;
Dudley W.

Adams of Iowa was made Master;
and William Saunders,
erstwhile Master of the National Grange,
D.

Wyatt Aiken of South Carolina,
and E.

R.

Shankland of Iowa were elected
to the executive committee.

The substitution of alert and eager workers,
already experienced in organizing Granges,

for the dead wood of the Washington bureaucrats gave the order a fresh impetus
to growth.

From the spring of 1873
to the following spring the number of granges more than quadrupled,
and the increase again centered mainly in the Middle West.By the end of 1873 the Grange had penetrated all but four States--Connecticut,
Rhode Island,
Delaware,
and Nevada--and there were thirty-two state Granges in existence.

The movement was now well defined and national in scope,
so that the seventh annual session of the National Grange,
which took place in St.

Louis in February,
1874,
attracted much interest and comment.

Thirty-three men and twelve women attended the meetings,
representing thirty-two state and territorial Granges and about half a million members.

Their most important act was the adoption of the "Declaration of Purposes of the National Grange," subscribed
to then and now as the platform of the Patrons and copied
with minor modifications by many later agricultural organizations in the United States.

The general purpose of the Patrons was "
to labor
for the good of our Order,
our Country,
and Mankind."

This altruistic ideal was
to find practical application in efforts
to enhance the comfort and attractions of homes,

to maintain the laws,

to advance agricultural and industrial education,

to diversify crops,

to systematize farm work,

to establish cooperative buying and selling,

to suppress personal,
local,
sectional,
and national prejudices,
and
to discountenance "the credit system,
the fashion system,
and every other system tending
to prodigality and bankruptcy."

As
to business,
the Patrons declared themselves enemies not of capital but of the tyranny of monopolies,
not of railroads but of their high freight tariffs and monopoly of transportation.

In politics,
too,
they maintained a rather nice balance:

the Grange was not
to be a political or party organization,
but its members were
to perform their political duties as individual citizens.It could hardly be expected that the program of the Grange would satisfy all farmers.


for the agricultural discontent,
as
for any other dissatisfaction,
numerous panaceas were proposed,
the advocates of each of which scorned all the others and insisted on their particular remedy.

Some farmers objected
to the Grange because it was a secret organization;
others,
because it was nonpartisan.


for some the organization was too conservative;

for others,
too radical.

Yet all these objectors felt the need of some sort of organization among the farmers,
very much as the trade-unionist and the socialist,
though widely divergent in program,
agree that the workers must unite in order
to better their condition.

Hence during these years of activity on the part of the Grange many other agricultural societies were formed,
differing from the Patrons of Husbandry in specific program rather than in general purpose.The most important of these societies were the farmers' clubs,
at first more or less independent of each other but later banded together in state associations.

The most striking differences of these clubs from the Granges were their lack of secrecy and their avowed political purposes.

Their establishment marks the definite entrance of the farmers as a class in
to politics.

During the years 1872
to 1875 the independent farmers' organizations multiplied much as the Granges did and
for the same reasons.

The Middle West again was the scene of their greatest power.

In Illinois this movement began even before the Grange appeared in the State,
and its growth during the early seventies paralleled that of the secret order.

In other States also,
notably in Kansas,
there sprang up at this time agricultural clubs of political complexion,
and where they existed in considerable numbers they generally took the lead in the political activities of the farmers' movement.

Where the Grange had the field practically
to itself,
as in Iowa and Minnesota,
the restriction in the constitution of the order as
to political or partisan activity was evaded by the simple expedient of holding meetings "outside the gate," at which platforms were adopted,
candidates nominated,
and plans made
for county,
district,
and state conventions.In some cases the farmers hoped,
by a show of strength,

to achieve the desired results through one or both of the old parties,
but they soon decided that they could enter politics effectively only by way of a third party.

The professional politicians were not inclined
to espouse new and radical issues which might lead
to the disruption of party lines.

The outcome,
therefore,
was the establishment of new parties in eleven of the Western States during 1873 and 1874.

Known variously as Independent,
Reform,
Anti-Monopoly,
or Farmers' parties,
these organizations were all parts of the same general movement,
and their platforms were quite similar.

The paramount demands were:

first,
the subjection of corporations,
and especially of railroad corporations,

to the control of the State;
and second,
reform and economy in government.

After the new parties were well under way,
the Democrats in most of the States,
being in a hopeless minority,
made common cause
with them in the hope of thus compassing the defeat of their hereditary rivals,
the old-line Republicans.

In Missouri,
however,
where the Democracy had been restored
to power by the Liberal-Republican movement,
the new party received the support of the Republicans.Illinois,
where the farmers were first thoroughly organized in
to clubs and Granges,
was naturally the first State in which they took effective political action.

The agitation
for railroad regulation,
which began in Illinois in the sixties,
had caused the new state constitution of 1870
to include mandatory provisions directing the legislature
to pass laws
to prevent extortion and unjust discrimination in railway charges.

One of the acts passed by the Legislature of 1871 in an attempt
to carry out these instructions was declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court in January,
1873.

This was the spark
to the tinder.

In the following April the farmers flocked
to a convention at the state capital and so impressed the legislators that they passed more stringent and effective laws
for the regulation of railroads.

But the politicians had a still greater surprise in store
for them.

In the elections of judges in June,
the farmers retired from office the judge who had declared their railroad law unconstitutional and elected their own candidates
for the two vacancies in the supreme court and
for many of the vacancies in the circuit courts.Now began a vigorous campaign
for the election of farmers' candidates in the county elections in the fall.

So many political meetings were held on Independence Day in 1873 that it was referred
to as the "Farmers' Fourth of July."

This had always been the greatest day of the farmer's year,

for it meant opportunity
for social and intellectual enjoyment in the picnics and celebrations which brought neighbors together in hilarious good-fellowship.

In 1873,
however,
the gatherings took on unwonted seriousness.

The accustomed spread-eagle oratory gave place
to impassioned denunciation of corporations and
to the solemn reading of a Farmers' Declaration of Independence.

"When,
in the course of human events," this document begins in words familiar
to every schoolboy orator,
"it becomes necessary
for a class of the people,
suffering from long continued systems of oppression and abuse,

to rouse themselves from an apathetic indifference
to their own interests,
which has become habitual .

.

.

a decent respect
for the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes that impel them
to a course so necessary
to their own protection."

Then comes a statement of "self-evident truths," a catalogue of the sins of the railroads,
a denunciation of railroads and Congress
for not having redressed these wrongs,
and finally the conclusion:
"We,
therefore,
the producers of the state in our several counties assembled .

.

.

do solemnly declare that we will use all lawful and peaceable means
to free ourselves from the tyranny of monopoly,
and that we will never cease our efforts
for reform until every department of our Government gives token that the reign of licentious extravagance is over,
and something of the purity,
honesty,
and frugality
with which our fathers inaugurated it,
has taken its place."

That
to this end we hereby declare ourselves absolutely free and independent of all past political connections,
and that we will give our suffrage only
to such men
for office,
as we have good reason
to believe will use their best endeavors
to the promotion of these ends;
and
for the support of this declaration,

with a firm reliance on divine Providence,
we mutually pledge
to each other our lives,
our fortunes,
and our sacred honor."


This fall campaign of 1873 in Illinois broke up old party lines in remarkable fashion.

In some counties the Republicans and in other counties the Democrats either openly joined the "Reformers" or refrained from making separate nominations.

Of the sixty-six counties which the new party contested,
it was victorious in fifty-three.

This first election resulted in the best showing which the Reformers made in Illinois.

In state elections,
the new party was less successful;
the farmers who voted
for their neighbors running on an Anti-Monopoly ticket
for lesser offices hesitated
to vote
for strangers
for state office.Other Middle Western States at this time also felt the uneasy stirring of radical political thought and saw the birth of third parties,
short-lived,
most of them,
but throughout their brief existence crying loudly and persistently
for reforms of all description.

The tariff,
the civil service system,
and the currency,
all came in
for their share of criticism and of suggestions
for revision,
but the dominant note was a strident demand
for railroad regulation.

Heirs of the Liberal Republicans and precursors of the Greenbackers and Populists,
these independent parties were as voices crying in the wilderness,
preparing the way
for national parties of reform.

The notable achievement of the independent parties in the domain of legislation was the enactment of laws
to regulate railroads in five States of the upper Mississippi Valley.* When these laws were passed,
the parties had done their work.

By 1876 they had disappeared or,
in a few instances,
had merged
with the Greenbackers.

Their temporary successes had demonstrated,
however,

to both farmers and professional politicians that if once solidarity could be obtained among the agricultural class,
that class would become the controlling element in the politics of the Middle Western States.

It is not surprising,
therefore,
that wave after wave of reform swept over the West in the succeeding decades.* See Chapter IV.

The independent parties of the middle seventies were distinctly spontaneous uprisings of the people and especially of the farmers,
rather than movements instigated by politicians
for personal ends or by professional reformers.

This circumstance was a source both of strength and weakness.

As the movements began
to develop unexpected power,
politicians often attempted
to take control but,
where they succeeded,
the movement was checked by the farmers' distrust of these self-appointed leaders.

On the other hand,
the new parties suffered from the lack of skillful and experienced leaders.

The men who managed their campaigns and headed their tickets were usually well-to-do farmers drafted from the ranks,

with no more political experience than perhaps a term or two in the state legislature.

Such were Willard C.

Flagg,
president of the Illinois State Farmers' Association,
Jacob G.

Vale,
candidate
for governor in Iowa,
and William R.

Taylor,
the Granger governor of Wisconsin.Taylor is typical of the picturesque and forceful figures which frontier life so often developed.

He was born in Connecticut,
of parents recently emigrated from Scotland.

Three weeks after his birth his mother died,
and six years later his father,
a sea captain,
was drowned.

The orphan boy,
brought up by strangers in Jefferson County,
New York,
experienced the hardships of frontier life and developed that passion
for knowledge which so frequently is found in those
to whom education is denied.

When he was sixteen,
he had,
enough of the rudiments
to take charge of a country school,
and by teaching in the winter and working in the summer he earned enough
to enter Union College.

He was unable
to complete the course,
however,
and turned
to teaching in Ohio,
where he restored
to decent order a school notorious
for bullying its luckless teachers.

But teaching was not
to be his career;
indeed,
Taylor's versatility
for a time threatened
to make him the proverbial Jack-of-all-trades:

he was employed successively in a grist mill,
a saw mill,
and an iron foundry;
he dabbled in the study of medicine;
and finally,
in the year which saw Wisconsin admitted
to the Union,
he bought a farm in that State.

Ownership of property steadied his interests and at the same time afforded an adequate outlet
for his energies.

He soon made his farm a model
for the neighborhood and managed it so efficiently that he had time
to interest himself in farmers' organizations and
to hold positions of trust in his township and county.By 1873 Taylor had acquired considerable local political experience and had even held a seat in the state senate.

As president of the State Agricultural Society,
he was quite naturally chosen
to head the ticket of the new Liberal Reform party.

The brewing interests of the State,
angered at a drastic temperance law enacted by the preceding legislature,
swung their support
to Taylor.

Thus reenforced,
he won the election.

As governor he made vigorous and tireless attempts
to enforce the Granger railroad laws,
and on one occasion he scandalized the conventional citizens of the State by celebrating a favorable court decision in one of the Granger cases
with a salvo of artillery from the capitol.Yet in spite of this prominence,
Taylor,
after his defeat
for reelection in 1875,
retired
to his farm and
to obscurity.

His vivid personality was not again
to assert itself in public affairs.

It is difficult
to account
for the fact that so few of the farmers during the Granger period played prominent parts in later phases of the agrarian crusade.

The rank and file of the successive parties must have been much the same,
but each wave of the movement swept new leaders
to the surface.The one outstanding exception among the leaders of the Anti-Monopolists was Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota "the sage of Nininger"--who remained a captain of the radical cohorts in every agrarian movement until his death in 1901.

A red-headed aggressive Irishman,

with a magnetic personality and a remarkable intellect,
Donnelly went
to Minnesota from Pennsylvania in 1856 and speculated in town sites on a large scale.

When he was left stranded by the panic of 1857,
acting upon his own principle that "
to hide one's light under a bushel is
to extinguish it," he entered the political arena.

In Pennsylvania Donnelly had been a Democrat,
but his genuine sympathy
for the oppressed made him an opponent of slavery and consequently a Republican.

In 1857 and 1858 he ran
for the state senate in Minnesota on the Republican ticket in a hopelessly Democratic county.

In 1859 he was nominated
for lieutenant governor on the ticket headed by Alexander Ramsey;
and his caustic wit,
his keenness in debate,
and his eloquence made him a valuable asset in the battle-royal between Republicans and Democrats
for the possession of Minnesota.

As lieutenant governor,
Donnelly early showed his sympathy
with the farmers by championing laws which lowered the legal rate of interest and which made more humane the process of foreclosure on mortgages.

The outbreak of the Civil War gave him an opportunity
to demonstrate his executive ability as acting governor during Ramsey's frequent trips
to Washington.

In this capacity he issued the first proclamation
for the raising of Minnesota troops in response
to the call of President Lincoln.

Elected
to Congress in 1862,
he served three terms and usually supported progressive legislation.Donnelly's growing popularity and his ambition
for promotion
to the Senate soon became a matter of alarm
to the friends of Senator Ramsey,
who controlled the Republican party in the State.

They' determined
to prevent Donnelly's renomination in 1868 and selected William D.

Washburn of Minneapolis
to make the race against him.

In the spring of this year Donnelly engaged in a controversy
with Representative E.

B.

Washburn of Illinois,
a brother of W.

D.

Washburn,
in the course of which the Illinois congressman published a letter in a St.

Paul paper attacking Donnelly's personal character.

Believing this
to be part of the campaign against him,
the choleric Minnesotan replied in the house
with a remarkable rhetorical display which greatly entertained the members but did not increase their respect
for him.

His opponents at home made effective use of this affair,
and the outcome of the contest was a divided convention,
the nomination of two Republicans,
each claiming
to be the regular candidate of the party,
and the ultimate election of a Democrat.Donnelly was soon ready
to break
with the old guard of the Republican party in national as well as in state politics.

In 1870 he ran
for Congress as an independent Republican on a low tariff platform but was defeated in spite of the fact that he received the endorsement of the Democratic convention.

Two years later he joined the Liberal Republicans in supporting Greeley against Grant.

When the farmers' Granges began
to spring up like mushrooms in 1873,
Donnelly was quick
to see the political possibilities of the movement.

He conducted an extensive correspondence
with farmers,
editors,
and politicians of radical tendencies all over the State and played a leading part in the organization of the Anti-Monopoly party.

He was elected
to the state senate in 1873,
and in the following year he started a newspaper,
the Anti-Monopolist,

to serve as the organ of the movement.Although Donnelly was technically still a farmer,
he was quite content
to leave the management of his farm
to his capable wife,
while he made politics his profession,

with literature and lecturing as avocations.

His frequent and brilliant lectures no less than his voluminous writings* attest his amazing industry.

Democrat,
Republican,
Liberal-Republican,
and Anti-Monopolist;
speculator,
lawyer,
farmer,
lecturer,
stump-speaker,
editor,
and author;
preacher of morals and practicer of shrewd political evasions;
and always a radical--he was
for many years a force
to be reckoned
with in the politics of his State and of the nation.* The Great Cryptogram,

for instance,
devotes a thousand pages
to proving a Bacon cipher in the plays of Shakespeare!


CHAPTER IV.

CURBING THE RAILROADS
Though the society of the Patrons of Husbandry was avowedly non-political in character,
there is ample justification
for the use of the term "Granger" in connection
with the radical railroad legislation enacted in the Northwestern States during the seventies.

The fact that the Grange did not take direct political action is immaterial:

certainly the order made political action on the part of the farmers possible by establishing among them a feeling of mutual confidence and trust whereby they could organize
to work harmoniously
for their common cause.

Before the advent of the Patrons of Husbandry the farmers were so isolated from each other that cooperation was impossible.

It is hard
for us
to imagine,
familiar as we are
with the rural free delivery of mail,

with the country telephone line,

with the automobile,
how completely the average farmer of 1865 was cut off from communication
with the outside world.

His dissociation from any but his nearest neighbors made him unsocial,
narrow-minded,
bigoted,
and suspicious.

He believed that every man's hand was against him,
and he was therefore often led
to turn his hand against every man.

Not until he was convinced that he might at least trust the Grangers did he lay aside his suspicions and join
with other farmers in the attempt
to obtain what they considered just railroad legislation.Certain it is,
moreover,
that the Grangers made use of the popular hostility
to the railroads in securing membership
for the order.

"Cooperation" and "Down
with Monopoly" were two of the slogans most commonly used by the Grange between 1870 and 1875 and were in large part responsible
for its great expansion.

Widely circulated reprints of articles exposing graft and corruption made excellent fuel
for the flames of agitation.How much of the farmers' bitterness against the railroads was justified it is difficult
to determine.

Some of it was undoubtedly due
to prejudice,

to the hostility of the "producer"
for the "nonproducer," and
to the suspicion which the Western farmer felt
for the Eastern magnate.

But much of the suspicion was not without foundation.

In some cases manipulation of railway stock had absolutely cheated farmers and agricultural towns and counties out of their investments.

It is a well-known fact that the corporations were not averse
to creating among legislators a disposition
to favor their interests.

Passes were commonly given by the railroads
to all public officials,
from the local supervisors
to the judges of the Supreme Court,
and opportunities were offered
to legislators
to buy stock far below the market price.

In such subtle ways the railroads insinuated themselves in
to favor among the makers and interpreters of law.

Then,
too,
the farmers felt that the railway companies made rates unnecessarily high and frequently practised unfair discrimination against certain sections and individuals.

When the Iowa farmer was obliged
to burn corn
for fuel,
because at fifteen cents a bushel it was cheaper than coal,
though at the same time it was selling
for a dollar in the East,
he felt that there was something wrong,
and quite naturally accused the railroads of extortion.The fundamental issue involved in Illinois,
Minnesota,
Iowa,
and Wisconsin,
where the battle was begun and fought
to a finish,
was whether or not a State had power
to regulate the tariffs of railway companies incorporated under its laws.

Railway companies,
many jurists argued,
were private concerns transacting business according
to the laws of the State and no more
to be controlled in making rates than dry goods companies in fixing the price of spools of thread;
rates,
like the price of merchandise,
were determined by the volume of trade and the amount of competition,
and
for a State
to interfere
with them was nothing less than tyranny.

On the other hand,
those who advocated regulation argued that railroads,
though private corporations,
were from the nature of their business public servants and,
as such,
should be subject
to state regulation and control.Some States,
foreseeing difficulties which might arise later from the doctrine that a charter is a contract,
as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in the famous Dartmouth College case,* had quite early in their history attempted
to safeguard their right
to legislate concerning corporations.

A clause had been inserted in the state constitution of Wisconsin which declared that all laws creating corporations might at any time be altered or repealed by the legislatures.

The constitution of Minnesota asserted specifically that the railroads,
as common carriers enjoying right of way,
were bound
to carry freight on equal and reasonable terMs. When the Legislature of Iowa turned over
to the railroad companies lands granted by the Federal Government,
it did so
with the reservation that the companies should be subject
to the rules and regulations of the General Assembly.

Thus these States were fortified not only by arguments from general governmental theory but also by written articles,
more or less specifically phrased,
on which they relied
to establish their right
to control the railroads.* See "John Marshall and the Constitution",
by Edward S.

Corwin (in "The Chronicles of America"),
p.

154 ff.

The first gun in this fight
for railroad regulation was fired in Illinois.

As early as 1869,
after several years of agitation,
the legislature passed an act declaring that railroads should be limited
to "just,
reasonable,
and uniform rates,
" but,
as no provision was made
for determining what such rates were,
the act was a mere encumbrance on the statute books.

In the new state constitution of 1870,
however,
the framers,
influenced by a growing demand on the part of the farmers which manifested itself in a Producers' Convention,
inserted a section directing the legislature
to "pass laws
to correct abuses and
to prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the different railroads in this State."

The legislature at its next session appears
to have made an honest attempt
to obey these instructions.

One act established maximum passenger fares varying from two and one-half
to five and one-half cents a mile
for the different classes in
to which the roads were divided.

Another provided,
in effect,
that freight charges should be based entirely upon distance traversed and prohibited any increases over rates in 1870.

This amounted
to an attempt
to force all rates
to the level of the lowest competitive rates of that year.

Finally,
a third act established a board of railroad and warehouse commissioners charged
with the enforcement of these and other laws and
with the collection of information.The railroad companies,
denying the right of the State
to regulate their business,
flatly refused
to obey the laws;
and the state supreme court declared the act regulating freight rates unconstitutional on the ground that it attempted
to prevent not only unjust discrimination but any discrimination at all.

The legislature then passed the Act of 1873,
which avoided the constitutional pitfall by providing that discriminatory rates should be considered as prima facie but not absolute evidence of unjust discrimination.

The railroads were thus permitted
to adduce evidence
to show that the discrimination was justified,
but the act expressly stated that the existence of competition at some points and its nonexistence at others should not be deemed a sufficient justification of discrimination.

In order
to prevent the roads from raising all rates
to the level of the highest instead of lowering them
to the level of the lowest,
the commissioners were directed
to establish a schedule of maximum rates;
and the charging of rates higher than these by any company after January 15,
1874,
was
to be considered prima facie evidence of extortion.

Other provisions increased the penalties
for violations and strengthened the enforcing powers of the commission in other ways.

This act was roundly denounced at the time,
especially in the East,
as an attempt at confiscation,
and the railroad companies refused
to obey it
for several years;
but ultimately it stood the test of the courts and became the permanent basis of railroad regulation in Illinois and the model
for the solution of this problem in many other States.The first Granger law of Minnesota,
enacted in 1871,
established fixed schedules
for both passengers and freight,
while another act of the same year provided
for a railroad commissioner.

In this instance also the companies denied the validity of the law,
and when the state supreme court upheld it in 1873,
they appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States.

In the meantime there was no way of enforcing the law,
and the antagonism toward the roads fostered by the Grange and the Anti-Monopoly party became more and more intense.

In 1874 the legislature replaced the Act of 1871
with one modeled on the Illinois law of 1873;
but it soon discovered that no workable set of uniform rates could be made
for the State because of the wide variation of conditions in the different sections.

Rates and fares which would be just
to the companies in the frontier regions of the State would be extortionate in the thickly populated areas.

This difficulty could have been avoided by giving the commission power
to establish varying schedules
for different sections of the same road;
but the anti-railroad sentiment was beginning
to die down,
and the Legislature of 1875,
instead of trying
to improve the law,
abandoned the attempt at state regulation.The Granger laws of Iowa and Wisconsin,
both enacted in 1874,
attempted
to establish maximum rates by direct legislative action,
although commissions were also created
to collect information and assist in enforcing the laws.

The Iowa law was very carefully drawn and appears
to have been observed,
in form at least,
by most of the companies while it remained in force.

In 1878,
however,
a systematic campaign on the part of the railroad forces resulted in the repeal of the act.

In Wisconsin,
a majority of the members of the Senate favored the railroads and,
fearing
to show their hands,
attempted
to defeat the proposed legislation by substituting the extremely radical Potter Bill
for the moderate measure adopted by the Assembly.

The senators found themselves hoist
with their own petard,
however,

for the lower house,
made up largely of Grangers,
accepted this bill rather than let the matter of railroad legislation go by default.

The rates fixed by the Potter Law
for many commodities were certainly unreasonably low,
although the assertion of a railroad official that the enforcement of the law would cut off twenty-five per cent of the gross earnings of the companies was a decided exaggeration.

Relying upon the advice of such eminent Eastern lawyers as William M.

Evarts,
Charles O'Conor,
E.

Rockwood Roar,
and Benjamin R.

Curtis that the law was invalid,
the roads refused
to obey it until it was upheld by the state supreme court late in 1874.

They then began a campaign
for its repeal.

Though they obtained only some modification in 1875,
they succeeded completely in 1876.The contest between the railroads and the farmers was intense while it lasted.

The farmers had votes;
the railroads had money;
and the legislators were sometimes between the devil and the deep sea in the fear of offending one side or the other.

The farmers' methods of campaign were simple.

Often questionnaires were distributed
to all candidates
for office,
and only those who went on record as favoring railroad restriction were endorsed by the farmers' clubs and committees.

An agricultural convention,
sometimes even a meeting of the state Grange,
would be held at the capital of the State while the legislature was in session,
and it was a bold legislator who,
in the presence of his farmer constituents,
would vote against the measures they approved.

When the railroads in Illinois refused
to lower their passenger rates
to conform
to the law,
adventurous farmers often attempted
to "ride
for legal fares," giving the trainmen the alternative of accepting the low fares or throwing the hardy passengers from the train.The methods of the railroads in dealing
with the legislators were most subtle.

Whether or not the numerous charges of bribery were true,
railroad favors were undoubtedly distributed among well disposed legislators.

In Iowa passes were not given
to the senators who voted against the railroads,
and those sent
to the men who voted in the railroads' interest were accompanied by notes announcing that free passes were no longer
to be given generally but only
to the friends of the railroads.

At the session of the Iowa Legislature in 1872,
four lawyers who posed as farmers and Grange members were well known as lobbyists
for the railroads.

The senate paid its respects
to these men at the close of its session by adopting the following resolution:
WHEREAS,
There have been constantly in attendance on the Senate and House of this General Assembly,
from the commencement of the session
to the present time,
four gentlemen professing
to represent the great agricultural interest of the State of Iowa,
known as the Grange;
and--
WHEREAS,
These gentlemen appear entirely destitute of any visible means of support;
therefore be it--
RESOLVED,
By the Senate,
the House concurring,
that the janitors permit aforesaid gentlemen
to gather up all the waste paper,
old newspapers,
&c.,
from under the desks of the members,
and they be allowed one postage stamp each,
The American Agriculturist,
What Greeley Knows about Farming,
and that they be permitted
to take
with them
to their homes,
if they have any,
all the rejected railroad tariff bills,
Beardsley's speech on female suffrage,
Claussen's reply,
Kasson's speech on barnacles,
Blakeley's dog bill,
Teale's liquor bill,
and be given a pass over the Des Moines Valley Railroad,

with the earnest hope that they will never return
to Des Moines.

Once the Granger laws were enacted,
the railroads either fought the laws in court or obeyed them in such a way as
to make them appear most obnoxious
to the people,
or else they employed both tactics.

The lawsuits,
which began as soon as the laws had been passed,
dragged on,
in appeal after appeal,
until finally they were settled in the Supreme Court of the United States.

These suits were not so numerous as might be expected,
because in most of the States they had
to be brought on the initiative of the injured shipper,
and many shippers feared
to incur the animosity of the railroad.

A farmer was afraid that,
if he angered the railroad,
misfortunes would befall him:

his grain might be delivered
to the wrong elevators or left
to stand and spoil in damp freight cars;
there might be no cars available
for grain just when his shipment was ready;
and machinery destined
for him might be delayed at a time when lack of it would mean the loss of his crops.

The railroads
for their part whenever they found an opportunity
to make the new laws appear obnoxious in the eyes of the people,
were not slow
to seize it.

That section of the Illinois law of 1873 which prohibited unjust discrimination went in
to effect in July,
but the maximum freight rates were not fixed until January of 1874.

As a result of this situation,
the railroads in July made all their freight rates uniform,
according
to the law,
but accomplished this uniformity by raising the low rates instead of lowering the high.

In Minnesota,
similarly,
the St.

Paul and Pacific road,
in its zeal
to establish uniform passenger rates,
raised the fare between St.

Paul and Minneapolis from three
to five cents a mile,
in order
to make it conform
to the rates elsewhere in the State.

The St.

Paul and Sioux City road declared that the Granger law made its operation unprofitable,
and it so reduced its train service that the people petitioned the commission
to restore the former rate.

In Wisconsin,
when the state supreme court affirmed the constitutionality of the radical Potter law,
the railroads retaliated in some cases by carrying out their threat
to give the public "Potter cars,
Potter rails,
and Potter time."

As a result the public soon demanded the repeal of the law.In all the States but Illinois the Granger laws were repealed before they had been given a fair trial.

The commissions remained in existence,
however,
although
with merely advisory functions;
and they sometimes did good service in the arbitration of disputes between shippers and railroads.

Interest in the railroad problem died down
for the time,
but every one of the Granger States subsequently enacted
for the regulation of railroad rates statutes which,
although more scientific than the laws of the seventies,
are the same in principle.

The Granger laws thus paved the way not only
for future and more enduring legislation in these States but also
for similar legislation in most of the other States of the Union and even
for the national regulation of railroads through the Interstate Commerce Commission.The Supreme Court of the United States was the theater
for the final stage of this conflict between the railroads and the farmers.

In October,
1876,
decisions were handed down together in eight cases which had been appealed from federal circuit and state courts in Illinois,
Wisconsin,
Iowa,
and Minnesota,
and which involved the validity of the Granger laws.

The fundamental issue was the same in all these cases--the right of a State
to regulate a business that is public in nature though privately owned and managed.The first of the "Granger cases," as they were termed by Justice Field in a dissenting opinion,
was not a railroad case primarily but grew out of warehouse legislation which the farmers of Illinois secured in 1871.

This act established maximum charges
for grain storage and required all warehousemen
to publish their rates
for each year during the first week in January and
to refrain from increasing these rates during the year and from discriminating between customers.

In an endeavor
to enforce this law the railroad and warehouse commission brought suit against Munn and Scott,
a warehouse firm in Chicago,

for failure
to take out the license required by the act.

The suit,
known as Munn vs.

Illinois,
finally came
to the United States Supreme Court and was decided in favor of the State,
two of the justices dissenting.* The opinion of the court in this case,
delivered by Chief Justice Waite,
laid down the principles which were followed in the railroad cases.

The attorneys
for the warehousemen had argued that the act in question,
by assuming
to limit charges,
amounted
to a deprivation of property without due process of law and was thus repugnant
to the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States.

But the court declared that it had long been customary both in England and America
to regulate by law any business in which the public has an interest,
such as ferries,
common carriers,
bakers,
or millers,
and that the warehouse business in question was undoubtedly clothed
with such a public interest.

Further,
it was asserted that this right
to regulate implied the right
to fix maximum charges,
and that what those charges should be was a legislative and not a judicial question.* 94 United States Reports,
113.

In deciding the railroad cases the courts applied the same general principles,
the public nature of the railroad business having already been established by a decision in 1872.* Another point was involved,
however,
because of the contention of the attorneys
for the companies that the railway charters were contracts and that the enforcement of the laws would amount
to an impairment of contracts,
which was forbidden by the Constitution.

The court admitted that the charters were contracts but denied that state regulation could be considered an impairment of contracts unless the terms of the charter were specific.

Moreover,
it was pointed out that contracts must be interpreted in the light of rights reserved
to the State in its constitution and in the light of its general laws of incorporation under which the charters were granted.* Olcott vs.

The Supervisors,
16 Wallace,
678.

These court decisions established principles which even now are of vital concern
to business and politics.

From that time
to this no one has denied the right of States
to fix maximum charges
for any business which is public in its nature or which has been clothed
with a public interest;
nor has the inclusion of the railroad and warehouse businesses in that class been questioned.

The opinion,
however,
that this right of the States is unlimited,
and therefore not subject
to judicial review,
has been practically reversed.

In 1890 the Supreme Court declared a Minnesota law invalid because it denied a judicial hearing as
to the reasonableness of rates*;
and the courts now assume it
to be their right and duty
to determine whether or not rates fixed by legislation are so low as
to amount
to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

In spite of this later limitation upon the power of the States,
the Granger decisions have furnished the legal basis
for state regulation of railroads down
to the present day.

They are the most significant achievements of the antimonopoly movement of the seventies.* 134 United States Reports,
418.


CHAPTER V.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE GRANGER MOVEMENT
The first phase of the agrarian crusade,
which centered around and took its distinctive name from the Grange,
reached its highwater mark in 1874.

Early in the next year the tide began
to ebb.

The number of Granges decreased rapidly during the remainder of the decade,
and of over twenty thousand in 1874 only about four thousand were alive in 1880.Several causes contributed
to this sudden decline.

Any organization which grows so rapidly is prone
to decay
with equal rapidity;
the slower growths are better rooted and are more likely
to reach fruition.

So
with the Grange.

Many farmers had joined the order,
attracted by its novelty and vogue;
others joined the organization in the hope that it would prove a panacea
for all the ills that agriculture is heir
to and then left it in disgust when they found its success neither immediate nor universal.Its methods of organization,
too,
while admirably adapted
to arousing enthusiasm and
to securing new chapters quickly,
did not make
for stability and permanence.

The Grange deputy,
as the organizer was termed,
did not do enough of what the salesman calls "follow-up work."

He went in
to a town,
persuaded an influential farmer
to go about
with him in a house-to-house canvass,
talked
to the other farmers of the vicinity,
stirred them up
to interest and excitement,
organized a Grange,
and then left the town.

If he happened
to choose the right material,
the chapter became an active and flourishing organization;
if he did not choose wisely,
it might drag along in a perfunctory existence or even lapse entirely.

Then,
too,
the deputy's ignorance of local conditions sometimes led him
to open the door
to the farmers' enemies.

There can be little doubt that insidious harm was worked through the admission in
to the Grange of men who were farmers only incidentally and whose "interest in agriculture" was limited
to making profits from the farmer rather than from the farm.

As D.

Wyatt Aiken,
deputy
for the Grange in the Southern States and later member of the executive committee of the National Grange,
shrewdly commented,
"Everybody wanted
to join the Grange then;
lawyers,

to get clients;
doctors,

to get customers;
Shylocks,

to get their pound of flesh;
and sharpers,

to catch the babes in the woods."


Not only the members who managed thus
to insinuate themselves in
to the order but also the legitimate members proved hard
to control.


with that hostility
to concentrated authority which so often and so lamentably manifests itself in a democratic body,
the rank and file looked
with suspicion upon the few men who constituted the National Grange.

The average farmer was interested mainly in local issues,
conditions,
and problems,
and looked upon the National Grange not as a means of helping him in local affairs,
but as a combination of monopolists who had taken out a patent on the local grange and forced him
to pay a royalty in order
to enjoy its privileges.

The demand
for reduction in the power of the National Grange led
to frequent attempts
to revise the constitution in the direction of decentralization;
and the revisions were such as merely
to impair the power of the National Grange without satisfying the discontented members.Of all the causes of the rapid collapse of the Granger movement,
the unfortunate experience which the farmers had in their attempts at business cooperation was probably chief.

Their hatred of the middleman and of the manufacturer was almost as intense as their hostility
to the railroad magnate;
quite naturally,
therefore,
the farmers attempted
to use their new organizations as a means of eliminating the one and controlling the other.

As in the parallel case of the railroads,
the farmers' animosity,
though it was probably greater than the provocation warranted,
was not without grounds.The middlemen--the commission merchants
to whom the farmer sold his produce and the retail dealers from whom he bought his supplies--did undoubtedly make use of their opportunities
to drive hard bargains.

The commission merchant had such facilities
for storage and such knowledge of market conditions that he frequently could take advantage of market fluctuations
to increase his profits.

The farmer who sold his produce at a low price and then saw it disposed of as a much higher figure was naturally enraged,
but he could devise no adequate remedy.

Attempts
to regulate market conditions by creating an artificial shortage seldom met
with success.

The slogan "Hold your hogs" was more effective as a catchword than as an economic weapon.

The retail dealers,
no less than the commission men,
seemed
to the farmer
to be unjust in their dealings
with him.

In the small agricultural communities there was practically no competition.

Even where there were several merchants in one town these could,
and frequently did,
combine
to fix prices which the farmer had no alternative but
to pay.

What irked the farmer most in connection
with these "extortions" was that the middleman seemed
to be a nonproducer,
a parasite who lived by chaining the agricultural classes of the wealth which they produced.

Even those farmers who recognized the middleman as a necessity had little conception of the intricacy and value of his service.Against the manufacturer,
too,
the farmer had his grievances.

He felt that the system of patent rights
for farm machinery resulted in unfair prices--
for was not this same machinery shipped
to Europe and there sold
for less than the retail price in the United States?

Any one could see that the manufacturer must have been making more than reasonable profit on domestic sales.

Moreover,
there were at this time many abuses of patent rights.

Patents about
to expire were often extended through political influence or renewed by means of slight changes which were claimed
to be improvements.

A more serious defect in the patent system was that new patents were not thoroughly investigated,
so that occasionally one was issued on an article which had long been in common use.

That a man should take out a patent
for the manufacture of a sliding gate which farmers had
for years crudely constructed
for themselves and should then collect royalty from those who were using the gates they had made,
naturally enough aroused the wrath of his victiMs.It was but natural,
then,
that the Granges should be drawn in
to all sorts of schemes
to divert in
to the pockets of their members the streams of wealth which had previously flowed
to the greedy middlemen.

The members of the National Grange,
thinking that these early schemes
for cooperation were premature,
did not at first take them up and standardize them but left them entirely in the hands of local,
county,
and state Granges.

These thereupon proceeded
to "gang their ain gait" through the unfamiliar paths of business operations and too frequently brought up in a quagmire.

"This purchasing business," said Kelley in 1867,
"commenced
with buying jackasses;
the prospects are that many will be SOLD."

But the Grangers went on
with their plans
for business cooperation
with ardor undampened by such forebodings.

Sometimes a local Grange would make a bargain
with a certain dealer of the vicinity,
whereby members were allowed special rates if they bought
with cash and traded only
with that dealer.

More often the local grange would establish an agency,

with either a paid or a voluntary agent who would forward the orders of the members in large lots
to the manufacturers or wholesalers and would thus be able
to purchase supplies
for cash at terms considerably lower than the retail prices.

Frequently,
realizing that they could get still more advantageous terms
for larger orders,
the Granges established a county agency which took over the work of several local agents.

Sometimes the Patrons even embarked upon the more ambitious enterprise of cooperative stores.The most common type of cooperative store was that in which the capital was provided by a stock company of Grange members and which sold goods
to Patrons at very low prices.

The profits,
when there were any,
were divided among the stockholders in proportion
to the amount of stock they held,
just as in any stock company.

This type of store was rarely successful
for any length of time.

The low prices at which it sold goods were likely
to involve it in competition
with other merchants.

Frequently these men would combine
to lower their prices and,
by a process familiar in the history of business competition,
"freeze out" the cooperative store,
after which they might restore their prices
to the old levels.

The farmers seldom had sufficient spirit
to buy at the grange store if they found better bargains elsewhere;
so the store was assured of its clientele only so long as it sold at the lowest possible prices.

Farmers' agencies
for the disposal of produce met
with greater success.

Cooperative creameries and elevators in several States are said
to have saved Grange members thousands of dollars.

Sometimes the state Grange,
instead of setting up in the business of selling produce,
chose certain firms as Grange agents and advised Patrons
to sell through these firMs. Where the choice was wisely made,
this system seems
to have saved the farmers about as much money without involving them in the risks of business.By 1876 the members of the National Grange had begun
to study the problem of cooperation in retailing goods and had come
to the conclusion that the so-called "Rochdale plan," a system worked out by an English association,
was the most practicable
for the cooperative store.

The National Grange therefore recommended this type of organization.

The stock of these stores was sold only
to Patrons,
at five dollars a share and in limited amounts;
thus the stores were owned by a large number of stockholders,
all of whom had equal voice in the management of the company.

The stores sold goods at ordinary rates,
and then at the end of the year,
after paying a small dividend on the stock,
divided their profits among the purchasers,
according
to the amounts purchased.

This plan eliminated the violent competition which occurred when a store attempted
to sell goods at cost,
and at the same time saved the purchaser quite as much.

Unfortunately the Rochdale plan found little favor among farmers in the Middle West because of their unfortunate experience
with other cooperative ventures.

In the East and South,
however,
it was adopted more generally and met
with sufficient success
to testify
to the wisdom of the National Grange in recommending it.In its attitude toward manufacturing,
the National Grange was less sane.

Not content
with the elimination of the middlemen,
the farmers were determined
to control the manufacture of their implements.


with the small manufacturer they managed
to deal fairly well,

for they could usually find some one who would supply the Grange
with implements at less than the retail price.

In Iowa,
where the state Grange early established an agency
for cooperative buying,
the agent managed
to persuade a manufacturer of plows
to give a discount
to Grangers.

As a result,
this manufacturer's plows are reported
to have left the factory
with the paint scarcely dry,
while his competitors,
who had refused
to make special terms,
had difficulty in disposing of their stock.

But the manufacturers of harvesters persistently refused
to sell at wholesale rates.

The Iowa Grange thereupon determined
to do its own manufacturing and succeeded in buying a patent
for a harvester which it could make and sell
for about half what other harvesters cost.

In 1874 some 250 of these machines were manufactured,
and the prospects looked bright.Deceived by the apparent success of grange manufacturing in Iowa,
officers of the order at once planned
to embark in manufacturing on a large scale.

The National Grange was rich in funds at this time;
it had within a year received well over $250,000 in dispensation fees from seventeen thousand new Granges.

Angered at what was felt
to be the tyranny of monopoly,
the officers of the National Grange decided
to use this capital in manufacturing agricultural implements which were
to be sold
to Patrons at very low prices.

They went about the country buying patents
for all sorts of farm implements,
but not always making sure of the worth of the machinery or the validity of the patents.

In Kansas,
Iowa,
Missouri,
Wisconsin,
Illinois,
Indiana,
and Kentucky,
they planned factories
to make harvesters,
plows,
wagons,
sewing- machines,
threshing-machines,
and all sorts of farm implements.

Then came the crash.

The Iowa harvester factory failed in 1875 and bankrupted the state Grange.

Other failures followed;
suits
for patent infringements were brought against some of the factories;
local Granges disbanded
for fear they might be held responsible
for the debts incurred;
and in the Northwest,
where the activity had been the greatest,
the order almost disappeared.Although the Grange had a mushroom growth,
it nevertheless exerted a real and enduring influence upon farmers both as individuals and as members of a class.

Even the experiments in cooperation,
disastrous though they were in the end,
were not without useful results.

While they lasted they undoubtedly effected a considerable saving
for the farmers.

As Grange agents or as stockholders in cooperative stores or Grange factories,
many farmers gained valuable business experience which helped
to prevent them from being victimized thereafter.

The farmers learned,
moreover,
the wisdom of working through the accepted channels of business.

Those who had scoffed at the Rochdale plan of cooperation,
in the homely belief that any scheme made in America must necessarily be better than an English importation,
came
to see that self-confidence and independence must be tempered by willingness
to learn from the experience of others.

Most important of all,
these experiments in business taught the farmers that the middlemen and manufacturers performed services essential
to the agriculturalist and that the production and distribution of manufactured articles and the distribution of crops are far more complex affairs than the farmers had imagined and perhaps worthy of more compensation than they had been accustomed
to think just.

On their side,
the manufacturers and dealers learned that the farmers were not entirely helpless and that
to gain their goodwill by fair prices was on the whole wiser than
to force them in
to competition.

Thus these ventures resulted in the development of a new tolerance and a new respect between the two traditionally antagonistic classes.The social and intellectual stimulus which the farmers received from the movement was probably even more important than any direct political or economic results.

It is difficult
for the present generation
to form any conception of the dreariness and dullness of farm life half a century ago.

Especially in the West,
where farms were large,
opportunities
for social intercourse were few,
and weeks might pass without the farmer seeing any but his nearest neighbors.


for his wife existence was even more drear.

She went
to the market town less often than he and the routine of her life on the farm kept her close
to the farmhouse and prevented visits even
to her neighbors' dwellings.

The difficulty of getting domestic servants made the work of the farmer's wife extremely laborious;
and at that time there were none of the modern conveniences which lighten work such as power churns,
cream separators,
and washing-machines.

Even more than the husband,
the wife was likely
to degenerate in
to a drudge without the hope--and eventually without the desire--of anything better.

The church formed,

to be sure,
a means of social intercourse;
but according
to prevailing religious notions the churchyard was not the place nor the Sabbath the time
for that healthy but unrestrained hilarity which is essential
to the well-being of man.In
to lives thus circumscribed the Grange came as a liberalizing and uplifting influence.

Its admission of women in
to the order on the same terms as men made it a real community servant and gave both women and men a new sense of the dignity of woman.

More important perhaps than any change in theories concerning womankind,
it afforded an opportunity
for men and women
to work and play together,
apparently much
to the satisfaction and enjoyment of both sexes.

Not only in Grange meetings,
which came at least once a month and often more frequently,
but also in Grange picnics and festivals the farmers and their wives and children came together
for joyous human intercourse.

Such frequent meetings were bound
to work a change of heart.

Much of man's self-respect arises from the esteem of others,
and the desire
to keep that esteem is certainly a powerful agent in social welfare.

It was reported that in many communities the advent of the Grange created a marked improvement in the dress and manners of the members.

Crabbed men came out of their shells and grew genial;
disheartened women became cheerful;
repressed children delighted in the chance
to play
with other boys and girls of their own age.The ritual of the Grange,
inculcating lessons of orderliness,
industry,
thrift,
and temperance,
expressed the members' ideals in more dignified and pleasing language than they themselves could have invented.

The songs of the Grange gave an opportunity
for the exercise of the musical sense of people not too critical of literary quality,
when
with "spontaneous trills on every tongue," as one of the songs has it,
the members varied the ritual
with music.One of the virtues especially enjoined on Grange members was charity.

Ceres,
Pomona,
and Flora,
offices of the Grange
to be filled.

only by women,
were made
to represent Faith,
Hope,
and Charity,
respectively;
and in the ceremony of dedicating the Grange hall these three stood always beside the altar while the chaplain read the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians.

Not only in theory but in practice did the order proclaim its devotion
to charitable work.

It was not uncommon
for members of a local Grange
to foregather and harvest the crops
for a sick brother or help rebuild a house destroyed by fire or tornado.

In times of drought or plague both state and national Granges were generous in donations
for the sufferers;
in 1874,
when the Mississippi River overflowed its banks in its lower reaches,
money and supplies were sent
to the farmers of Louisiana and Alabama;
again in the same year relief was sent
to those Patrons who suffered from the grasshopper plague west of the Mississippi;
and in 1876 money was sent
to South Carolina
to aid sufferers from a prolonged drought in that State.

These charitable deeds,
endearing giver and receiver
to each other,
resulted in a better understanding and a greater tolerance between people of different parts of the country.The meetings of the local Granges were forums in which the members trained themselves in public speaking and parliamentary practice.

Programs were arranged,
sometimes
with the help of suggestions from officers of the state Grange;
and the discussion of a wide variety of topics,
mostly economic and usually concerned especially
with the interests of the farmer,
could not help being stimulating,
even if conclusions were sometimes reached which were at variance
with orthodox political economy.

The Grange was responsible,
too,

for a great increase in the number and circulation of agricultural journals.

Many of these papers were recognized as official organs of the order and,
by publishing news of the Granges and discussing the political and economic phases of the farmers' movement,
they built up an extensive circulation.

Rural postmasters everywhere reported a great increase in their mails after the establishment of a Grange in the vicinity.

One said that after the advent of the order there were thirty newspapers taken at his office where previously there had been but one.

Papers
for which members or local Granges subscribed were read,
passed from hand
to hand,
and thoroughly discussed.

This is good evidence that farmers were forming the habit of reading.

All the Granger laws might have been repealed;
all the schemes
for cooperation might have come
to naught;
all the moral and religious teachings of the Grange might have been left
to the church;
but if the Granger movement had created nothing else than this desire
to read,
it would have been worth while.


for after the farmer began
to read,
he was no longer like deadwood floating in the backwaters of the current;
he became more like a propelled vessel in midstream--sometimes,

to be sure,
driven in
to turbulent waters,
sometimes tossed about by conflicting currents,
but at least making progress.


CHAPTER VI.

THE GREENBACK INTERLUDE
Whatever may have been the causes of the collapse of the Granger movement in 1875 and 1876,
returning prosperity
for the Western farmer was certainly not one of them,

for the general agricultural depression showed no signs of lifting until nearly the end of the decade.

During the Granger period the farmer attempted
to increase his narrow margin of profit or
to turn a deficit in
to a profit by decreasing the cost of transportation and eliminating the middleman.

Failing in this attempt,
he decided that the remedy
for the situation was
to be found in increasing the prices
for his products and checking the appreciation of his debts by increasing the amount of money in circulation.This demand
for currency inflation was by no means new when it was taken up by the Western farmers.

It had played a prominent part in American history from colonial days,
especially in periods of depression and in the less prosperous sections of the ever advancing frontier.

During the Civil War,
inflation was actually accomplished through the issue of over $400,000,000 in legal-tender notes known as "greenbacks."

No definite time
for the redemption of these notes was specified,
and they quickly declined in value as compared
with gold.

At the close of the war a paper dollar was worth only about half its face value in gold.

An attempt was made
to raise the relative value of the greenbacks and
to prepare
for the resumption of specie payments by retiring the paper money from circulation as rapidly as possible.

This policy meant,
of course,
a contraction of the volume of currency and consequently met
with immediate opposition.

In February,
1868,
Congress prohibited the further retirement of greenbacks and left
to the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury the reissue of the $44,000,000 which had been retired.

Only small amounts were reissued,
however,
until after the panic of 1873;
and when Congress attempted,
in April,
1874,

to force a permanent increase of the currency
to $400,000,000,
President Grant vetoed the bill.Closely related
to the currency problem was that of the medium
to be used in the payment of the principal of bonds issued during the Civil War.

When the bonds were sold,
it was generally understood that they would be redeemed in gold or its equivalent.

Some of the issues,
however,
were covered by no specific declaration
to that effect,
and a considerable sentiment arose in favor of redeeming them
with currency,
or lawful money,
as it was called.These questions were not party issues at first,
and there was no clear-cut division upon them between the two old parties throughout the period.

The alinement was by class and section rather than by party;
and inflationists and advocates of the redemption of the bonds in currency were
to be found not only among the rank and file but also among the leaders of both parties.

The failure of either the Democrats or the Republicans
to take a decided stand on these questions resulted,
as so often before,
in the development of third parties which made them the main planks in the new platform.The first attempts at organized political activity in behalf of greenbackism came not from the farmers of the West but from the laboring men of the East,
whose growing class consciousness resulted in the organization of the National Labor Union in 1868.

Accompanying,
if not resulting from the Government's policy of contraction,
came a fall of prices and widespread unemployment.

It is not strange,
therefore,
that this body at once declared itself in favor of inflation.

The plan proposed was what was known as the "American System of Finance":

money was
to be issued only by the Government and in the form of legal-tender paper redeemable only
with bonds bearing a low rate of interest,
these bonds in turn
to be convertible in
to greenbacks at the option of the holder.

The National Labor Union recommended the nomination of workingmen's candidates
for offices and made arrangements
for the organization of a National Labor party.

This convened in Columbus in February,
1872,
adopted a Greenback platform,
and nominated David Davis of Illinois as its candidate
for the presidency.

After the nomination of Horace Greeley by the Liberal Republicans,
Davis declined this nomination,
and the executive committee of his party then decided that it was too late
to name another candidate.This early period of inflation propaganda has been described as "the social reform period,
or the wage-earners' period of greenbackism,
as distinguished from the inflationist,
or farmers' period that followed."

The primary objects of the labor reformers were,
it appears,

to lower the rate of interest on money and
to reduce taxation by the transformation of the war debt in
to interconvertible bonds.

The farmers,
on the other hand,
were interested primarily in the expansion of the currency in the hope that this would result in higher prices
for their products.

It was not until the panic of 1873 had intensified the agricultural depression and the Granger movement had failed
to relieve the situation that the farmers of the West took hold of greenbackism and made it a major political issue.The independent parties of the Granger period,
as a rule,
were not in favor of inflation.

Their platforms in some cases demanded a speedy return
to specie payment.

In 1873 Ignatius Donnelly,
in a pamphlet entitled "Facts
for the Granges",
declared:

"There is too much paper money.

The currency is DILUTED--WATERED--WEAKENED .

.

.

.

We have no interest in an inflated money market.

.

.

As we have
to sell our wheat at the world's ;.price,
it is our interest that everything we buy should be at the world's price.

Specie payments would practically add eighteen cents
to the price of every bushel of wheat we have
to sell!" In Indiana and Illinois,
however,
the independent parties were captured by the Greenbackers,
and the Indiana party issued the call
for the conference at Indianapolis in November,
1874,
which led
to the organization of the National Greenback party.This conference was attended by representatives from seven States and included several who had been prominent in the Labor Reform movement.

"The political Moses of the 'New Party,
"' according
to the Chicago Tribune,
was James Buchanan of Indianapolis,
a lawyer "
with an ability and shrewdness that compel respect,
however much his theories may be ridiculed and abused."

He was also the editor of the Sun,
a weekly paper which supported the farmers' movement.

The platform committee of the conference reported in favor of "a new political organization of the people,
by the people,
and
for the people,

to restrain the aggressions of combined capital upon the rights and interests of the masses,

to reduce taxation,
correct abuses,
and
to purify all departments of the Government."

The most important issue before the people was declared
to be "the proper solution of the money question," meaning thereby the issue of greenbacks interconvertible
with bonds.

A national convention of the party was called
to meet at Cleveland on March 11,
1875.The Cleveland convention,
attended by representatives of twelve States,
completed the organization of the Independent party,
as it was officially named,
and made arrangements
for the nominating convention.

This was held at Indianapolis on May 17,
1876,

with 240 delegates representing eighteen States.

Ignatius Donnelly,
who had apparently changed his mind on the currency question since 1873,
was the temporary president.

The platform contained the usual endorsement of a circulating medium composed of legal-tender notes interconvertible
with bonds but gave first place
to a demand
for "the immediate and unconditional repeal of the specie-resumption act."

This measure,
passed by Congress in January,
1875,
had fixed January 1,
1879,
as the date when the Government would redeem greenbacks at their face value in coin.

Although the act made provision
for the permanent retirement of only a part of the greenbacks from circulation,
the new party denounced it as a "suicidal and destructive policy of contraction."

Another plank in the platform,
and one of special interest in view of the later free silver agitation,
was a protest against the sale of bonds
for the purpose of purchasing silver
to be substituted
for the fractional currency of war times.

This measure,
it was asserted,
"although well calculated
to enrich owners of silver mines will still further oppress,
in taxation,
an already overburdened people."


There was a strong movement in the convention
for the nomination of David Davis
for the presidency,
but this seems
to have met
with opposition from Eastern delegates who remembered his desertion of the National Labor Reform party in 1872.

Peter Cooper of New York was finally selected as the candidate.

He was a philanthropist rather than a politician and was now eighty-five years old.

Having made a large fortune as a pioneer in the manufacture of iron,
he left his business cares
to other members of his family and devoted himself
to the education and elevation of the working classes.

His principal contribution
to this cause was the endowment of the famous Cooper Union in New York,
where several thousand persons,
mostly mechanics,
attended classes in a variety of technical and educational subjects and enjoyed the privileges of a free library and reading room.

When notified of his nomination,
Cooper at first expressed the hope that one or both of the old parties might adopt such currency planks as would make the new movement unnecessary.

Later he accepted unconditionally but took no active part in the campaign.The Greenback movement at first made but slow progress in the various States.

In Indiana and Illinois the existing independent organizations became component parts of the new party,
although in Illinois,
at least,
quite a number of the former leaders returned
to the old parties.

In the other Western States,
however,
the third parties of the Granger period had gone
to pieces or had been absorbed by means of fusion,
and new organizations had
to be created.

In Indiana the Independent party developed sufficient strength
to scare the Republican leaders and
to cause one of them
to write
to Hayes:

"A bloody-shirt campaign,

with money,
and Indiana is safe;
a financial campaign and no money and we are beaten."


The Independents do not appear
to have made a very vigorous campaign in 1876.

The coffers of the party were as empty as the pockets of the farmers who were soon
to swell its ranks;
and this made a campaign of the usual sort impossible.

One big meeting was held in Chicago in August,

with Samuel F.

Cary,
the nominee
for Vice-President,
as the principal attraction;
and this was followed by a torchlight procession.

A number of papers published by men who were active in the movement,
such as Buchanan's Indianapolis Star,
Noonan's Industrial Age of Chicago,
and Donnelly's Anti-Monopolist of St.

Paul,
labored not without avail
to spread the gospel among their readers.

The most effective means of propaganda,
however,
was probably the Greenback Club.

At a conference in Detroit in August,
1875,
"the organization of Greenback Clubs in every State in the Union" was recommended,
and the work was carried on under the leadership of Marcus M.

Pomeroy.

"Brick" Pomeroy was a journalist,
whose sobriquet resulted from a series of Brickdust Sketches of prominent Wisconsin men which he published in one of his papers.

As the editor of Brick Pomeroy's Democrat,
a sensational paper published in New York,
he had gained considerable notoriety.

In 1875,
after the failure of this enterprise he undertook
to retrieve his broken fortunes by editing a Greenback paper in Chicago and by organizing Greenback clubs
for which this paper served as an organ.

Pomeroy also wrote and circulated a series of tracts
with such alluring titles as Hot Drops and Meat
for Men.

Several thousand clubs were organized in the Northwest during the next few years,
principally in the rural regions,
and the secrecy of their proceedings aroused the fear that they were advocating communism.

The members of the clubs and their leaders constituted,
as a matter of fact,
the more radical of the Greenbackers.

They usually opposed fusion
with the Democrats and often refused
to follow the regular leaders of the party.In the election the Greenback ticket polled only about eighty thousand votes,
or less than one per cent of the total.

In spite of the activity of former members of the Labor Reform party in the movement,
Pennsylvania was the only Eastern State in which the new party made any considerable showing.

In the West over 6000 votes were cast in each of the five States--Indiana,
Illinois,
Michigan,
Iowa,
and Kansas.

The agrarian aspect of the movement was now uppermost,
but the vote of 17,000 polled in Illinois,
though the largest of the group,
was less than a quarter of the votes cast by the state Independent Reform party in 1874 when railroad regulation had been the dominant issue.

Clearly many farmers were not yet convinced of the necessity of a Greenback party.

The only tangible achievement of the party in 1876 was the election of a few members of the Illinois Legislature who held the balance between the old parties and were instrumental in sending David Davis
to the United States Senate.

This vote,
it is interesting
to note,
kept Davis from serving on the electoral commission and thus probably prevented Tilden from becoming President.But the Greenback movement was
to find fresh impetus in 1877,
a year of exceptional unrest and discontent throughout the Union.

The agricultural depression was even greater than in preceding years,
while the great railroad strikes were evidence of the distress of the workingmen.

This situation was reflected in politics by the rapid growth of the Greenback party and the reappearance of labor parties
with Greenback planks.*
* In state elections from Massachusetts
to Kansas the Greenback and labor candidates polled from 5
to 15 per cent of the total vote,
and in most cases the Greenback vote would probably have been much greater had not one or the other,
and in some cases both,
of the old parties incorporated part of the Greenback demands in their platforMs. In Wisconsin,

for example,
there was little difference between Democrats and Greenbackers on the currency question,
and even the Republicans in their platform leaned toward inflation,
although the candidates declared against it.

No general elections were held in 1877 in some of the States where the Greenback sentiment was most pronounced.

In the following year the new party had an excellent opportunity
to demonstrate its strength wherever it existed.

In February,
1878,
a conference was held at Toledo
for the purpose of welding the various political organizations of workingmen and advocates of inflation in
to an effective weapon as a single united party.

This conference,
which was attended by several hundred delegates from twenty-eight States,
adopted "National" as the name of the party,
but it was usually known from this time on as the Greenback Labor party.

The Toledo platform,
as the resolutions adopted by this conference came
to be designated,
first denounced "the limiting of the legal-tender quality of greenbacks,
the changing of currency-bonds in
to coin-bonds,
the demonetization of the silver dollar,
the excepting of bonds from taxation,
the contraction of the circulating medium,
the proposed forced resumption of specie payments,
and the prodigal waste of the public lands."

The resolutions which followed demanded the suppression of bank notes and the issue of all money by the Government,
such money
to be full legal-tender at its stamped value and
to be provided in sufficient quantity
to insure the full employment of labor and
to establish a rate of interest which would secure
to labor its just reward.

Other planks called
for the coinage of silver on the same basis as that of gold,
reservation of the public lands
for actual settlers,
legislative reduction of the hours of labor,
establishment of labor bureaus,
abolition of the contract system of employing prison labor,
and suppression of Chinese immigration.

It is clear that in this platform the interests of labor received full consideration.

Just before the conference adjourned it adopted two additional resolutions.

One of these,
adopted in response
to a telegram from General B.

F.

Butler,
denounced the silver bill just passed by Congress because it had been so modified as
to limit the amount of silver
to be coined.

The other,
which was offered by "Brick" Pomeroy,
declared:

"We will not affiliate in any degree
with any of the old parties,
but in all cases and localities will organize anew .

.

.

and .

.

.

vote only
for men who entirely abandon old party lines and organizations."

This attempt
to forestall fusion was
to be of no avail,
as the sequel will show,
but Pomeroy and his followers in the Greenback clubs adhered throughout
to their declaration.In the elections of 1878,
the high-water mark of the movement,
about a million votes were cast
for Greenback candidates.

Approximately two-thirds of the strength of the party was in the Middle West and one-third in the East.

That the movement,
even in the East,
was largely agrarian,
is indicated by the famous argument of Solon Chase,
chairman of the party convention in Maine.

"Inflate the currency,
and you raise the price of my steers and at the same time pay the public debt."

"Them steers" gave Chase a prominent place in politics
for half a decade.

The most important achievement of the movement at this time was the election
to Congress of fifteen members who were classified as Nationals--six from the East,
six from the Middle West,
and three from the South.

In most cases these men secured their election through fusion or through the failure of one of the old parties
to make nominations.Easily first among the Greenbackers elected
to Congress in 1878 was General James B.

Weaver of Iowa.

When ten years of age,
Weaver had been taken by his parents
to Iowa from Ohio,
his native State.

In 1854,
he graduated from a law school in Cincinnati,
and
for some years thereafter practiced his profession and edited a paper at Bloomfield in Davis County,
Iowa.

He enlisted in the army as a private in 1861,
displayed great bravery at the battles of Donelson and Shiloh,
and received rapid promotion
to the rank of colonel.

At the close of the war he received a commission as brigadier general by brevet.

Weaver ran his first tilt in state politics in an unsuccessful attempt
to obtain the Republican nomination
for lieutenant governor in